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Credit Stagnation in Latin America
ADOLFO BARAJAS and ROBERTO STEINER*
This study examines the recent marked slowdown in bank credit to the private sector
in Latin America. Based on a study of eight countries—Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and Venezuela—the magnitude of the slowdown is
documented, comparing it to historical behavior and to similar episodes in other
regions of the world. Second, changes in bank balance sheets are examined to
determine whether the credit slowdown is merely a reflection of a downturn in bank
deposits or whether the asset side has changed. Third, following an econometric
disequilibrium approach used in recent studies of bank credit in East Asia and
Finland, the paper investigates the possible causes in three countries: Colombia,
Mexico, and Peru. While both supply and demand factors appear to have played key
roles, their relative importance has varied across the three countries. [JEL G21]
A
fter experiencing moderate to high rates of growth during most of the
1990s, several Latin American countries witnessed a significant slowdown
over the past two years. As Table 1 illustrates, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela recently experienced declines in their growth
rates, ranging from about 1 percentage point in Brazil to 7 percentage points in
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drafts. We have particularly benefited from comments by Alejandro Werner, Jerry Caprio, Maria Carkovic,
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Table 1. Average Real Growth Rates of GDP
and Credit to the Private Sector
Selected Latin American Countries
Deposit Money Banks















































Source: International Financial Statistics.
Argentina. One prominent exception to this behavior is Mexico, for which
economic growth accelerated by about 1 percentage point on average after 1995.
In many cases, the evolution of bank credit to the private sector has followed
a similar, or even more pronounced, cyclical pattern. When deflated by consumer
prices, during the above periods credit growth decelerated by about 5 percentage
points in Chile, by over 9 percentage points in Brazil, by 13 in Argentina,
18 percentage points in Bolivia, and by over 20 percentage points in Colombia and
Peru. Mexico and Venezuela stand in contrast, however; in Mexico credit growth
fell 34 percentage points, even as economic growth was accelerating;
1 and in
Venezuela economic growth declined while credit enjoyed a modest recovery.
Given that in most Latin American countries only a few large corporations can
tap foreign capital markets, understanding the recent slowdown in domestic bank
credit becomes a very relevant issue. In policy circles it is widely believed that the
credit slowdown is an important driving force behind the recent economic slump,
and that monetary policy may be, at least partly, to blame. This idea is consistent
with the "credit channel" literature, which, starting with the seminal work by
Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Romer and Romer (1990), and others, shows how
the provision of credit by banks to the private sector constitutes a key conduit
through which monetary policy affects the real economy.
*Two explanations have been offered for this lack of a relationship between credit growth and
economic activity in Mexico. First, it has been pointed out that large corporations have ample access to
foreign capital markets, thereby being able to invest and grow in spite of the fact that, following the 1994
"tequila crisis," the Mexican financial system has experienced severe difficulties. A second interpretation
has to do with accounting issues—while we observe a decline in credit when we look at banks' assets,
corporations who have not repaid their credits or who have had access to debt restructuring programs have
not seen their effective financing curtailed.
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However, tightness of monetary policy is not the only possible reason why
credit is stagnating in Latin America. It may be the case that, due to deteriorating
economic conditions, there is little demand for credit from the private sector, as
agents' balance sheets and investment prospects have worsened. Regarding supply,
it may be that banks have suffered from sluggish growth in their loanable funds
(that is, deposits), thus affecting their ability to lend. Finally, banks may have
become less willing to lend, perhaps partly due to deteriorating economic condi-
tions but also to their perception of risk and to the regulations regarding their risk
taking. Policy implications as to how to address this credit stagnation will depend
crucially on a correct interpretation of the underlying factors. Interventions, if
warranted, might range from programs to alleviate corporate debt burdens,
enhancing the provision of liquidity on the part of the central bank, or revising the
regulatory framework regarding the level of provisions.
I. Credit Stagnation in Latin America: A First Look
In this section we describe the recent performance of bank credit in eight countries
mentioned in the previous section. First, we show the evolution of credit in histor-
ical context, comparing the recent behavior to previous cycles over a period of
about 30 years. Secondly, we compare the slowdown with several international
cases where pronounced credit contractions were studied. Thirdly, we focus on the
last 20 years, using a simple balance sheet decomposition to detect where the
major changes occurred in the behavior of banks from one period to the next.
The Credit Slowdown in Historical and International Context
Several differences and similarities arise when comparing the evolution of bank
credit over the past 30 years in Latin America. Using International Financial
Statistics (IFS) data, in Figure 1 we plot the ratio of private sector bank credit to
GDP for the 1960-2000 period. We show this ratio both from Deposit Money
Banks (DMB), as well as from the entire banking system, DMB plus Other
Banking Institutions (OBI).
2 While six out of eight countries—Brazil and Chile
being the exception—exhibit a slowdown with some amount of decline in the ratio
in recent years,
3 the patterns for the entire period are not all alike. In Peru and
Bolivia the slowdown seems to be an interruption in a process of rapid credit
growth after hyperinflation had driven credit close to zero. Brazil, Chile, Mexico,
and, especially, Argentina all experienced pronounced credit cycles since the
1960s. For Colombia there has been a modest but steady upward trend since 1960
and for Venezuela a sustained downward trend since the early 1980s.
2 Although definitions vary across countries, DMB is meant to comprise institutions that raise a signif-
icant portion of their funds from the public in the form of demand deposits. OBIs, on the other hand, are
banking institutions that raise little or no funds from demand deposits.
3 Following Gourinchas, Valdes, and Landerretche (2001), we divide the end-year stock of credit in
year t by the geometric average of GDP in t and t + 1. Thus, we include forecasts of GDP for 2001, based
on real GDP forecasts by the IMF and ECLA, and on the latest inflation figures available.
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Given this recent decline in bank credit to the private sector, it is relevant to
examine whether there has been a substitution towards financing by nonbank
financial institutions. For most of the countries this is clearly not the case, since
the definition of OBIs is sufficiently broad to include such institutions as savings
and loan corporations, credit cooperatives, investment banks, and financial funds.
In two of the countries, however, IFS provides an additional category, "Nonbank
Financial Institutions" (NFI)—leasing companies, brokerage houses and distrib-
utor companies in Brazil, and pension funds in Chile. Substitution toward NFIs
does not appear to have taken place in Brazil, as nonbank credit amounted to less
than 4 percent of bank credit in 2000. In Chile, on the other hand, the credit slow-
down corresponded to a sharp rise of pension funds in the late 1980s, reaching
almost one-quarter of bank credit by 1991. In the case of Mexico, information for
savings and loan institutions (SLIs), investment societies, and brokerage houses
shows that SLIs constituted a very small share of bank credit—less than 1
percent—while security holdings by the other nonbank institutions have been
expanding rapidly since 1996, suggesting that corporate financing through the
stock market has substituted to some degree for the slowdown in bank credit.
4
How does the recent experience compare with historical behavior of bank
credit? We undertook a second exercise using the 1960-2000 data, based on the
Gourinchas, Valdes, and Landerretche (2001) study of credit booms. We used the
Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filter to calculate the trend in the credit-GDP ratio and
then identified periods of credit booms as those in which the observed ratio is
significantly above trend.
5 As Table 2 and Figure 2 show, several countries expe-
rienced credit booms prior to their recent slowdowns; for instance Bolivia, Brazil,
and Mexico all had credit booms in the early 1990s. Although the well-known
end-of-period problem associated with the H-P filter does not allow us to derive
similar conclusions regarding the severity of the recent slowdowns, we do observe
from mid-period observations that, prior to the more recent recoveries, both Chile
and Venezuela experienced severe credit contractions during the early 1990s,
when credit-GDP fell well below trend.
How does the recent Latin American experience compare with those of credit
slowdowns in other regions of the world? We examined the following international
cases of pronounced credit contractions: Finland in 1992-97 (Pazarbasioglu,
1997), Indonesia in 1997-99, and Thailand in 1998-2000 (both in Ghosh and
Ghosh, 1999); Japan in 1993-99 (Woo, 1999); Korea in 1997-98 (in Ghosh and
Ghosh, 1999, and Kim, 1999); and the United States in 1990-93 (Bernanke and
Lown, 1991; and Peek and Rosengren, 1995). In Table 3 we compare the episodes
by showing the declines in credit-GDP with respect to a peak level for each of the
slowdown episodes. For the non-Latin American countries, experiences vary
widely. Finland, Indonesia, and Thailand register dramatic declines in a relatively
short period of time, Korea experienced a short-lived and small drop, whereas
4For a complete set of IFS definitions of bank and nonbank credit, and for figures on nonbank credit,
see Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2 in Barajas and Steiner (2002).
5 As Table 2 shows, we chose an absolute threshold of 5 percentage points and a relative threshold of
25 percent, consistent with Gourinchas, Valdes, and Landerretche (2001). Thus, an observation in which
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Table 3. Latin American Credit Slowdowns
in Comparison to Selected International Cases















Other cases of credit slowdown
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Indonesia
Japan (Deposit Money Banks)





















































































Sources: International Financial Statistics; Bank of Korea; and authors' calculations.
Japan and the United States exhibit much more modest but extended downturns in
credit. Of all the countries in the table, the largest total decline in credit-GDP was
56 percentage points, experienced by Venezuela (1983-95), followed closely by
Finland's 44 percentage point contraction (1992-97). On a per year basis, the
largest declines were those of post-crisis Thailand and Indonesia, where over 10
percentage points were lost per year. Credit-GDP fell by almost 30 percentage
points in the case of all banks in Chile (1985-91) and by about 19 percentage
points for DMBs in Mexico, or over 3 percentage points per year, and over 4
percentage points per year for all banks in Colombia.
On the surface it may appear that the recent credit slowdowns in Latin America
have been less pronounced than in other parts of the world. However, the experi-
ence of earlier episodes—including Chile, Finland, and Venezuela—show that they
did become severe over time. So far the recent Latin American slowdowns have
been relatively short, lasting about 3 years as opposed to 13 years in Venezuela, 7
in Chile, and 6 in Finland. In Latin America we might be witnessing the first stages
of a more protracted process. Table 3 also shows that the credit contractions
continued well into 2001 in all countries, and even intensified in several cases.
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Table 4. The Recent Credit Slowdown in Latin America—A Summary
Deposit Money Banks
1. Preliberalization period
Average real growth rates







a. Credit expansion period
Average real growth rates






b. Credit slowdown period
Average real growth rates
















































































































Sources: International Financial Statistics; and authors' calculations.
The Latin American Credit Slowdown: Some Stylized Facts
We now turn to a closer look at the evolution of credit and bank behavior in our
eight countries, focusing on a shorter sample period, 1980-2000. In Tables 4 and
5 we show average annual real growth rates of credit and deposits for different
subperiods, as well as the ratios of credit to deposits and credit to total assets. For
the six countries in which the slowdown is recent (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru; see Table 4), we divide the period into three
portions: (1) the preliberalization period of the 1980s, characterized by relatively
repressed financial markets and thereby low credit growth; (2) the expansion
period of the early 1990s, spurred in part by financial liberalizations undertaken at
the beginning of the decade; and (3) the recent slowdown period. The expansion
is defined as ending in the year when credit-GDP reached its peak of the 1990s. In
Brazil and Mexico, credit peaked in 1995; in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, and
Peru, in 1998.
For the other two countries, Chile and Venezuela (Table 5), the slowdown
occurred earlier, and the more recent period is characterized by a recovery in credit.
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Table 5. Earlier Credit Slowdowns in Latin America—A Summary
Chile Venezuela
Deposit Money Banks
1. Credit expansion period
Average real growth rates






2. Credit slowdown period
Average real growth rates






3. Credit recovery period
Average real growth rates










































Sources: International Financial Statistics; and authors' calculations.
In Chile, financial markets were liberalized much sooner than in the rest of the
region, while Venezuela observed a positive terms of trade shock after 1973, and
faced severe macroeconomic distress in the early 1990s. Thus, we divide the
sample period for these two countries into the following subperiods: (1) credit
expansion in the 1970s and early 1980s; (2) credit slowdown in the late 1980s and
early 1990s; and (3) credit recovery in the late 1990s.
There are several consistent patterns across the first group of countries. The
acceleration and subsequent slowdown observed in credit growth also occurred on
the deposit side. The latter may have been the result of deregulation and financial
reform programs that reduced taxes on financial intermediation, liberalized
interest rates, and encouraged savings through the banking system. In the more
recent period there has been a disintermediation process following a period of
financial turmoil, in which capital outflows took place and bank deposits fell.
Thus, it may be that the slowdown in credit was driven primarily by a slowdown
in deposits, and banks merely reacted passively in response to a squeeze on their
loanable funds. However, it appears that although deposit growth was in fact a key
165Adolfo Barajas and Roberto Steiner
factor, it was not the entire story. Indeed, except in the case of Brazil, the slow-
down in credit is more pronounced than that in deposits. In fact, in some cases
deposits continued to grow in real terms while real credit fell.
This behavior was not always symmetrical across the expansion and slow-
down. In Argentina and Colombia, the expansion phase was more pronounced for
deposits, while the slowdown was more pronounced for credit. For the other three
countries, the entire cycle of the 1990s was more pronounced for credit; thus the
loan-deposit and loan-asset ratios increased during the expansion and fell during
the slowdown. This is also the case in the earlier slowdowns, Chile and Venezuela.
In fact, in Venezuela the recent credit recovery period is characterized by a slow-
down in deposits.
A Decomposition of Credit Growth
In this section we present a summarized balance sheet for commercial banks, and
observe the major changes that took place in bank activities in the subperiods
described above. We decompose credit growth to the private sector into banks'
sources of funds or alternative uses of funds. Based on IFS data, we define the
major balance sheet categories as:
Sources of funds (SF) IFS line items
Deposits and other liabilities Demand, savings, and time deposits;
with the private sector: money market funds, bonds, and restricted
deposits.
Net foreign liabilities: Foreign assets minus foreign liabilities and
long-term foreign liabilities.
Capital and other: Capital and other items, net.
Alternative uses of funds (AUF)
Net credit to the public sector: Claims on central and local government,
public entities, public financial institutions,
minus government deposits.
Net credit to the central bank: Reserves minus liabilities with the monetary
authorities.
The distinction between "sources" and "uses" is not clear cut. For example, accu-
mulating foreign assets may be viewed as an alternative use, while contracting a
foreign debt could be considered a source of funds. The purpose was to keep a
simple classification that would yield a small number of groups that could be
easily identified. We proceeded to decompose credit growth to the private sector
in the three periods by using the following balance sheet identity:
CREDIT, = SF, - AUF,
 ACREDIT
CREDITt CREDITt CREDITt '
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This decomposition yields an average real growth rate for credit in each
subperiod, which is then decomposed into each source and alternative use of
funds. We then calculate the differences in growth rates between subperiods and
also decompose these into sources and alternative uses. We present a summary of
this calculation in Tables 6 and 7, where we indicate the four balance sheet factors
that had the greatest impact on changes in credit growth in each phase and for each
country.
6 Also, we define "contributing" factors as those that moved in a direction
consistent with the change in credit growth rate, and "offsetting" factors as those
that moved in the opposite direction. For example, in Argentina real credit accel-
erated from an average growth rate of -6.7 percent in the preliberalization period
to 7.7 percent in the expansion period, thus a turnaround of 14.4 percentage points.
Table 6 shows that two major factors contributed to this, namely deposits and
capital, whose growth rate accelerated by 20.7 and 2.8 percentage points, respec-
tively. Their effect was offset to a certain extent, however, by a deceleration in the
banks' position with respect to the central bank (4.8 percentage points) and with
respect to the nonfinancial public sector (2.1 percentage points).
A number of characteristics of the credit cycle become apparent. First, the
single most important factor contributing to the changes in credit growth was
deposit growth. For five of the eight countries it had the largest impact during the
expansion, and for another five it had the largest impact during the slowdown.
There are no cases in which deposits were not the dominant factor in at least one
of the two phases, and in four countries—Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, and
Peru—they were the dominant factor in both phases.
Second, the comovement of deposit and credit growth dropped during the
slowdown. Taking a simple average of the relative contribution of deposits to credit
growth changes across the eight countries, we find that deposits accounted for 63
percent of the acceleration in credit growth during the expansion, and for 53
percent of the deceleration during the slowdown. Excluding Venezuela, where the
recent credit upswing came together with a decline in deposits, the comovement
drops from 77 to 50 percent, when comparing expansion and contraction phases.
Third, the net position with the central bank generally played an important role,
albeit for different reasons. In three countries net central bank credit has been highly
procyclical. In the case of Brazil, it was the dominant accelerating factor during the
expansion and the dominant decelerating factor during the contraction. In Chile, it
was the dominant accelerating element during the expansion and a major decelerating
factor during the contraction. In Mexico, net central bank credit was the dominant
factor decelerating credit in the recent slowdown. On the other hand, in Argentina and
Peru, and to a lesser extent in Bolivia and Colombia, it played an offsetting role,
contracting during the expansionary period and expanding during the contraction. In
the case of Peru it was the major offsetting factor in both phases, as reserve require-
ments were kept high during the expansion and relaxed during the decline.
6 In the case of Mexico, we analyzed the slowdown up to December 1996, because of an accounting
change in early 1997. Most of the decline is captured in 1995-96, however, after which credit remained
relatively stable for several years. In the case of Argentina, we analyzed the expansion after 1994, in order
to isolate an accounting change at the end of 1993. For the complete decomposition of real credit growth
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Table 7. Earlier Credit Slowdowns in Latin America:
Major Factors Affecting Changes in Credit Growth
Credit slowdown vs. expansion period
Change in annual real credit growth














Relative contribution of deposits (percent)
Combined effect of major factors
Percent of total change in credit growth
Credit recovery vs. slowdown period
Change in annual real credit growth
















































Relative contribution of deposits (percent)
Combined effect of major factors







Sources: International Financial Statistics; and authors' calculations.
Fourth, except in Colombia and Mexico, net foreign liabilities (NFL) played
an important role in credit growth. They were a major contributing factor during
both phases in Bolivia, Peru, and Chile and played a major role in Venezuela's
contraction. On the other hand, they were a major offsetting factor in the recent
contractions of Argentina and Brazil.
Fifth, a fiscal factor (NFPS in Table 6) played a major role in accelerating
Mexico's credit in the early 1990s and in Venezuela's recent credit recovery. In
Bolivia and Chile, and to a lesser extent in Argentina and Colombia, credit to the
public sector on occasions acted as a major offsetting factor. Regarding the
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slowdown, net credit to the NFPS was a significant contributing factor for all
countries except Bolivia and Chile. This may reflect a fiscal expansion that
squeezed out private sector credit, and/or a reduction in risk taking by banks,
who may have decided to increase their holdings of relatively safe government
securities rather than increase loans.
Finally, the private sector credit slowdown appears to be more complex than
the expansion, as it involves changes in a larger number of balance sheet items. We
generally find that the aggregate relative contribution of a small number of
factors—two contributing, two offsetting—falls from the expansion to the slow-
down. For example, in Argentina the major factors accounted for 115 percent of
the expansion, but for only 77 percent of the slowdown.
II. Econometric Analysis
A vast empirical literature has recently emerged, which focuses on the possible
causes of credit contraction in different countries.
7 In many cases the approach
followed is to use data at the macro level to identify whether or not specific situ-
ations of credit contraction can be identified as being a "credit crunch," defined as
a situation in which, for a given level of deposits, banks refuse to increase interest
rates on their loans to market-clearing levels, and thus, excess demand for credit
remains unsatisfied. Such a situation can emerge either because banks' perceptions
of corporate risk are too high, or because they simply do not have enough capital
to accommodate riskier loans. In our econometric estimation, we follow this type
of approach (as in Pazarbasioglu, 1997; Ghosh and Ghosh, 1999; Kim, 1999; and
Barajas, Lopez, and Oliveros, 2001), which is sufficiently general to permit us to
separate demand from supply-side determinants of credit growth, and allows us to
capture any possible "credit crunch" phenomenon.
Methodological Issues
We estimated aggregate demand and supply functions for credit in three of the
countries analyzed: Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. The econometric approach
used is based on pioneering work by Laffont and Garcia (1977) and Sealey
(1979), and consists of estimating the system of supply and demand functions
under the assumption that, at a given point in time, the credit market may either
exhibit equilibrium, or temporary excess demand or supply owing to imperfect
flexibility in the interest rate in the short run. Thus, in addition to capturing the
main determinants of credit growth, the approach also allows one to assess
whether a situation of excess demand, or credit crunch, occurred during an
episode of declining credit growth.
7 Empirical studies of credit contractions include Bernanke and Lown (1991) for the United States;
Pazarbasioglu (1997) for Finland; Ghosh and Ghosh (1999) for Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand;
Agenor, Aizenman, and Hoffmaister (2000) for Thailand; Kim (1999) for Korea; Ding, Domac, and
Ferri (2000) for East Asia; Catao (1997) and Braun and Levy-Yeyati (2001) for Argentina; Berrospide
and Dorich (2001) for Peru; Carrasquilla, Galindo, and Vasquez (2000); and Barajas, Lopez, and
Oliveros (2001) for Colombia. Braun and Hausmann (2001) compare credit crunches throughout the
world with those in Latin America.
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Actual credit observed at time t, Ch is defined as lying either on the supply curve




where Cf and Ct are the supply and demand functions, respectively, defined as a






Without adequate information on the price adjustment process, and assuming that the
errors u\ and u2 are normally distributed, a likelihood function may be determined for
the above model. Defining Xt as the probability that a given observation t lies on the
supply function (that is, demand is greater than supply), and given that g() is the joint
density function for supply and demand derived from the joint density function for u\
and u2, then the density function for Ct under the assumption of excess demand is:
ic,\c, = q) = fcg(cf,ct)dcf/xr
(3)
Similarly, the density function under the assumption of excess supply is:
h(ct\ct = cf)=fcg(ct,q)dq/(i-xt).
(4)
The unconditional density function is then equal to:
h(c)=ihctc=q )+{\-x\h(c\c=cA
= fc8(cf,q)dcf+fcg(q,q)dq. (5)
The likelihood function is L = Ylh(Ct), and the corresponding log likelihood to be




Maximization of equation (6) permits the estimation of both equations as well as
the estimation of the probability of observed credit lying on either of the curves,
A,.
8 As in previous studies, we used OLS estimates of the supply and demand func-
tions to provide initial values for the coefficients and standard errors. Although
Maddala (1983) warns that the likelihood function is unbounded for certain
parameter values, we found the OLS estimates to perform well as starting values,
and convergence tended to occur relatively quickly.
Specification Issues
In specifying the supply and demand functions, several issues emerge. First, identi-
fication of the model requires that one or more variables included in one function be
8Details of this method are discussed in Maddala (1983) and in Gourieroux (2000).
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excluded from the other. Past studies using this approach have used one key variable,
lending capacity (LC), to distinguish the supply from the demand function. Lending
capacity, defined as the availability of loanable funds, would affect banks' ability to
lend but would have no impact on credit demand. We followed this approach,
including as LC a subset of loanable funds over which banks have little discretionary
power, thereby constituting an exogenous determinant of credit supply.
A second specification issue involves variables reflecting the macroeconomic
and business environment, since one expects credit demand to be positively related
to them, and credit supply to respond to these variables to the extent that they
affect the riskiness of loans. As in previous studies, we included manufacturing
production indices (MANUF), GDP measures (y), the output gap (GAP),
9 the
expected inflation rate (INFE)
1
0 as a measure of macroeconomic stability, and the
stock market index (STKMKT). As discussed in Ghosh and Ghosh (1999), the last
variable may also reflect the availability of alternatives to bank credit—equity
finance in particular—from the demand side. Thus, the stock market index will
have a positive coefficient if the macro conditions effect dominates, or a negative
one if the substitution effect dominates.
Third, as in previous studies, we included interest rates on deposits (id) and on
government securities (ig) as proxies for the opportunity cost of bank credit either
from the demand or supply side. Fourth, in contrast to previous studies, for Peru
and Mexico we included the country-specific JP Morgan EMBI price,
1
1 which we
expected to have dual effects similar to those of the stock market index. A positive
impact on credit demand would arise if the dominant effect was an improvement
in macroeconomic perspectives, while a negative effect would arise when EMBI
signaled an increase in foreign investors' willingness to lend to domestic residents,
thus drawing customers away from bank credit.
Finally, also in contrast to previous studies, we included two additional vari-
ables specific to the supply function: the ratio of nonperforming loans to total
loans (NPL), and the ratio of loan-loss provisions to nonperforming loans
(PROV).
1
2 The former reflects past credit risk and may signal financial difficulties
in the banking system, while the latter reflects the severity of regulations on risk-
taking in lending activities. We expected banks to diminish credit supply in
response to mounting credit risk and/or increasing provisions being imposed upon
them.
1
3 These variables also provided us with additional identifying distinctions
between the supply and demand functions.
9This variable was used only in the Colombian case and was obtained as a linear monthly interpola-
tion of the quarterly output gap series constructed by Misas and Enciso (2001).
10We defined INFEt as a three-month moving average of the twelve-month inflation rate, centered at
month t.
11 For Colombia, the EMBI price was introduced too recently to be used in the estimations.
12Also, in the case of Colombia and Peru, we included the lagged regulatory capital ratio (capital to
risk-weighted assets), but this variable generally did not perform well in the initial OLS estimations and
thus tended to lead to convergence problems in the ML estimation.
1
3 We use provisions as a leading indicator of loans because in our setup provisions are a proxy for
the severity of regulations. Other things being equal, stiffer regulations today suggest lower credit supply
tomorrow. This does not contradict the fact that each specific provisioning act is, in practice, preceded by
a credit decision (Blaschke, and others, 2001). In the latter case, the lag between provisioning and credit
is almost impossible to disentangle from aggregate data.
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III. Estimation Results
In the next sections we describe the estimation results for each of the three coun-
tries, as shown in Tables 8-10. In all cases, the dependent variable was the natural
log of real credit to the private sector, LRCRED, with subtle differences from
country to country, as we explain below. We report the estimated parameters with
their t-statistics, the value of the log-likelihood function, and the R
2 for the initial
OLS estimations of the supply and demand functions. Since the dependent vari-
able was found to exhibit a unit root in all three cases, we conducted tests to deter-
mine whether real credit and its predicted value formed a cointegrating vector.
1
4
In virtually all cases we rejected the null hypothesis of no cointegration, at least at
the 5 percent level.
1
5 Thus, even though real credit has a unit root, it is appropriate
to estimate the model in levels.
Colombia
We used both monthly and quarterly data. Monthly data were available from
September 1992 to March 2001, while quarterly information was available from
the last quarter of 1991 to the second quarter of 2001. Quarterly estimations
allowed us to use the quarterly GDP directly. We do not report OLS estimations,
which in most instances provided coefficients that were statistically significant,
and with the expected sign. In order to partially deal with endogeneity problems,
we use lagged values of provisions, nonperforming loans, manufacturing output,
stock market indices, and real lending capacity. Most of the variables are also
taken in natural logs, so that coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities.
In Table 8 we report the results of the disequilibrium ML estimation. In the
first three columns we present the results for DMBs, and in the last four columns
we present those for the entire financial system, adjusted by loan write offs to
offset accounting changes that may not reflect the true flow of bank credit to the
private sector.
1
6 All estimations yield some common results. Various measures of
macroeconomic conditions appear to be significant in the supply and demand
functions. In particular, lagged manufacturing output is positively related to both
supply and demand in all monthly estimations, and real GDP is positively related
to loan demand in the quarterly estimations. The stock market index appears to
reflect present and future economic conditions, rather than equity finance as a
substitute for bank credit; thus, its coefficient in the demand function is positive
and significant across monthly and quarterly estimations. The output gap exhibits
a negative coefficient, similar to the result obtained by Ghosh and Ghosh (1999)
14We also tested whether real credit was cointegrated with the demand-side determinants, on the one
hand, and the supply side determinants, on the other. The results also supported the existence of a cointe-
grating vector.
1
5 The full set of ADF tests, which overwhelmingly fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all
definitions of real credit used in the estimations, as well as the cointegration tests, are available upon request.
16We obtained the unadjusted series for DMBs from IFS data, and the adjusted series for the finan-
cial system from the Colombian Banking Superintendency. As shown in Barajas, Lopez, and Oliveros
(2001), during 1998-2000, this adjustment reduces the measured annual credit decline from almost 13
percent to about 7 percent for the total financial system.
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for Indonesia, and may reflect the fact that firms increase (decrease) their demand
for external financing over own resources in bad (good) times. Since this variable
was only available for a shorter time period, we excluded it from all but regres-
sion (1). The deposit interest rate performed better than the government interest
rate as a proxy for the opportunity cost of bank credit from the demand side. As
the deposit rate increased relative to the lending rate, it tended to have a positive
impact on credit demand. Finally, as in previous studies, we found lending
capacity to be positively and significantly related to credit supply, with an elas-
ticity approaching unity in quarterly regressions. We used a summary measure of
real lending capacity (RLC), defined as deposits minus reserves,
1
7 as well as
including deposits and reserves separately. The results overall were similar, but
we observed better performance, primarily in the demand function when we used
the summary measure.
Some differences also arise across equations. Expected inflation tended to
be slightly negatively related to credit demand, but only exhibited a large t-
statistic in regression (4), a monthly estimation for adjusted financial system
credit. Monthly estimations were noticeably better at capturing the sensitivity of
demand and supply to real or nominal lending interest rates. In particular,
lending interest rates were rarely significant in the supply function when using
quarterly data, and the results for other variables tended to improve when this
variable was excluded from the supply equation. Finally, although the measures
of credit risk and regulation always exhibited the expected negative sign in the
supply function, both were rarely significant at the same time. The interaction
variable (NPL*PROV, or the ratio of loan-loss provisions to total loans) was
negative and significant throughout, however, thus showing that a combination
of credit risk and regulatory power had a negative impact on the willingness of
banks to provide credit.
Mexico
There are important differences in the Mexican case with respect to the Colombian
estimations. On the one hand, we included JP Morgan's EMBI price as an explana-
tory variable in the demand function. This allows us to test whether, particularly
after the 1994 "tequila crisis," greater availability of foreign financing permitted
the private sector to grow in spite of severe problems in the financial sector. If this
was the case, then we would expect a negative coefficient in the demand function;
as the index increases, foreign financing becomes more easily available and, other
things constant, demand for credit from domestic banks should decline. A second
difference is that we were unable to assemble the dataset for the period prior to
1993 while for the post-1993 period, there are variables for which more than one
source is available.
In Table 9 we report six different estimations, for two different time periods,
and using two different dependent variables. For regressions (1)-(3), the depen-
dent variable is the stock of private credit from deposit money banks as reported
17In the case of DMBs, we also included foreign liabilities.
174WHY DON'T THEY LEND? CREDIT STAGNATION IN LATIN AMERICA
Table 8. Colombia: Credit Demand and Supply

































































































































































































































































































Notes: t-statistics shown in parentheses. Significance levels of 5 percent (**) and 10 percent (*) indicated. The letter L at the beginning of a
variable name denotes natural logarithm.
'Adjusted credit is defined as the stock of credit plus loan write-offs. In addition, in regression (4) two small state-owned financial institu-
tions are excluded.
2 Defined as deposits plus foreign liabilities minus reserves.Adolfo Barajas and Roberto Steiner
by the IFS, we used monthly data for 1993:12 to 2000:12. This time period allows
us to capture part of the pre-1995 lending boom as well as the subsequent down-
turn. Similar to the Colombian case, for regressions (4)-(6) we used an adjusted
credit series constructed by the Banco de Mexico, which incorporates the effects
of two major debt restructuring programs,
1
8 one consisting of a partial write off of
bank debts funded, and another consisting of a government purchase of nonper-
forming loans. The time period is 1997:02-2001:05, and thus includes only the
downturn phase. In most estimations, we used real GDP in order to proxy for
aggregate macroeconomic conditions. Since GDP is available quarterly, we used
the same real GDP level for each month within the quarter. In the last estimation,
regression (6), we used the monthly index of manufacturing production.
There are two sources of data for nonperforming loans. The first, which we
used in regressions (1)-(3), was obtained from the World Bank. This series is quar-
terly, and was available from 1992:4 to 2000:4. Monthly series for both nonper-
forming loans and the loan-loss provisions were obtained from the Banco de
Mexico, but were available only starting in 1997:01, and so were used in regres-
sions (4)-(6).
In all six estimations, the EMBI price appears to be negatively and signifi-
cantly related to credit demand, reflecting the degree of substitution for Mexican
firms between domestic and foreign financing. As expected, demand for loans is
negatively related with the lending interest rate, and the respective coefficient is
statistically significant in all but one estimation. Finally, the demand for financial
sector loans is positively associated with economic activity, either proxied by real
GDP or manufacturing output. However, this association is significant only in two
of the six estimations reported.
Regarding the supply of bank loans, in general it is associated in a positive and
statistically significant manner with lending capacity, which we defined in two
alternative ways: DEP1, equal to the sum of demand, time, and foreign currency
deposits; and DEP2, which also includes money market funds.
1
9 As expected, the
supply of loans depends positively on their interest rates, and most of the regres-
sions yielded a statistically significant coefficient.
We attempted to capture the opportunity costs of alternative uses of bank
funds, by including the interest rate on government paper (ig) in the supply func-
tion. We obtain a positive, albeit not statistically significant, coefficient. The best
estimations were obtained when ig was not included.
18We used a measure that accounted for the effect of credit restructuring programs beginning in late
1995. The specific name given to this series is "total financing to the private sector, considering loans
related to restructuring programs." This adjustment addresses to some extent the concern that the decline
in private sector credit as seen from balance sheets of banks overestimates the credit contraction actually
experienced by the private sector. To the extent that debts were restructured and refinanced, and in some
instances directly removed from banks' balance sheets and transferred to collecting agencies, the balance
sheet tends to overstate the decline in credit.
19Contrary to both the Colombian and Peruvian cases, throughout our study period Mexican banks
were not subject to reserve requirements; therefore, we did not subtract reserves from deposits to obtain
lending capacity, since held reserves would be essentially voluntary and thus endogenous to banks'
lending decisions.
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Table 9. Mexico: Credit Demand and Supply

















































































































































































































Johansen Cointegration tests between dependent variable and predicted values from the ML estimation
Null hypothesis: no cointegration
Xtrace,0 lagged difference terms. 15.218** 13.306** 10.561 39.598*** 27.913***
Atrace, lags 1-12 included. 15.498** 16.305** 15.140** 17.957*** 15.220**
50.675***
32.866***
Notes: t-statistics shown in parentheses. Significance levels of 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) indicated. The letter
L at the beginning of a variable name denotes natural logarithm.
1Defined as the stock of credit plus adjustments to incorporate private sector loan restructuring programs beginning in mid-1995.
2This dummy variable takes a value of zero up until 1994:12, and then unity thereafter, thus testing for a structural change after
the credit expansion period.
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Regarding loan quality, the two groups of regressions shown in Table 9
must be interpreted separately. For the longer period (regressions (1)-(3)) we
use the quarterly World Bank non-performing loans data, and are unable to
control for provisions. We also interacted NPL with a dummy variable equal to
zero until the end of 1994 and equal to 1 afterwards (D9501), so as to test for
the possibility that regulation and supervision became tighter—and thus bank
behavior became more sensitive to credit risk—after the financial crisis of late
1994 and early 1995.
Our results are consistent with a significant shift in bank behavior after the
1994 crisis. Prior to 1995, the supply of loans to the private sector was posi-
tively associated with the level of NPL. One possible interpretation of this
result is that, in the context of weak regulation, banks were probably
"gambling for resurrection," by increasing their supply of credit when credit
risk was rising.
Following the crisis, and given that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
sum of the coefficients of NPL and of the interactive variable (D9501 *NPL) is
equal to zero, this type of adverse behavior would have ceased. Note, however,
that according to this group of regressions, we do not obtain the expected nega-
tive relationship between credit supply and NPL, not even in the post-crisis
period.
The results reported in regressions (4)-(6) of Table 9 seem much more
comforting. For the shorter, post-crisis period, and using the redefined version
of credit, in all three estimations we consistently obtain negative and statisti-
cally significant coefficients both for nonperforming loans as well as for provi-
sions. As was mentioned above, unfortunately we were unable to obtain data on
provisions for the period prior to 1997.
Peru
The regression results for Peru are shown in Table 10, which we divide into two
pairs of regressions according to the credit series used. In regressions (1) and (2)
we use the summary variable for real lending capacity (RLC), and in regressions
(3) and (4) we disaggregate it into its components, deposits and reserves.
Several differences emerge with respect to the other two countries
analyzed. First, the Peruvian case appears to be the only one in which expected
inflation is a consistently significant variable explaining demand for credit.
Private agents in Peru appear to extract more information about macroeco-
nomic conditions from the evolution of inflation. Second, in contrast to the
case of Mexico, the EMBI price is now positively related to credit demand,
presumably because it reflects macroeconomic conditions more than the
private sector's ability to obtain financing abroad. Third, especially in regres-
sions (1) and (2), credit demand is affected significantly by a wider set of
macro indicators. Finally, it proved very difficult to arrive at supply and
demand functions that both exhibited their expected signs for the lending
interest rate. This may be related to the high degree of dollarization of bank
activities in Peru, which makes it difficult to construct an appropriate lending
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Table 10. Peru: Credit Demand and Supply













































































































































































Notes: t-statistics shown in parentheses. Significance levels of 5 percent (**) and 10 percent (*) indicated. The letter
L at the beginning of a variable name denotes natural logarithm.
179Adolfo Barajas and Roberto Steiner




We also observe some results that are common to those of Colombia and
Mexico. Lending capacity—as defined in the Colombian case—was a major deter-
minant of credit supply. As in the Colombian case, we also find better results when
using the summary variable; namely, the t-statistics in several of the demand vari-
ables improve noticeably.
2
1 Credit risk and/or regulation factors also proved to be
relevant for credit supply, and in regressions (1)-(3), both are significant at the
same time.
Decomposition of Estimated Changes in Credit
Based on selected regression results from Tables 6-8, we decomposed the
predicted changes in supply and demand, contrasting the expansion and slowdown
periods in each country. We concentrated on the predicted shifts in the supply and
demand curves, excluding all changes brought about as a result of adjustments in
interest rates. We grouped changes in supply under three headings: macroeco-
nomic conditions (stock market index, manufacturing output, and real GDP),
lending capacity, and risk/regulation factors (NPL, PROV, or their interaction). In
each case, the estimated change was defined as the coefficient multiplied by the
change in the explanatory variable throughout the given expansion or slowdown
period. For example, the estimated change attributable to NPL in Colombia during
the expansion would be equal to its coefficient of -0.05 in the quarterly regression
(6) multiplied by the change in NPL from 1992:1 to 1997:4. The results of the
decomposition exercise are shown in Table 11.
Observing the components of changes in the supply curve, it is apparent that in
all countries the expansion and slowdown periods were very different. With the
exception of Peru, where improving loan quality contributed substantially to the
expansion, in all the other countries lending capacity explained well over 90 percent
of the expansion.
2
2 During the slowdown, however, in all countries the combination
of credit and regulatory tightening contributed to a reduced willingness to lend. In
fact, in Peru this effect appears to offset completely a continued expansion in lending
capacity in recent years. The dominant role played by the availability of loanable
funds in Colombia, particularly during the credit expansion period, is also related to
the role played by capital inflows intermediated by the domestic financial system.
20The regressions reported use domestic currency deposit and lending interest rates. We also ran
regressions using foreign currency interest rates, but there was no improvement and, in many cases, the
results were worse. A possible alternative may be to construct average implicit interest rates from the
balance sheet and earnings statements of banks.
21It must also be noted that previous regressions using the IFS series "claims on the private sector" as
the dependent variable yielded extremely high t-statistics for RLC, close to 80. Since the IFS series
included investments by the banking sector, the estimation equation tended to approach an identity, thus
contributing to this problem. By switching to a credit series produced by the Central Bank of Peru, which
excluded investments, we obtained lower t-statistics for lending capacity, and were able to capture more
accurately the recent decline in credit to the private sector.
22Note that the adverse "gambling for resurrection" behavior, while statistically significant, was quan-
titatively small in the Mexican case.
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Table 11. Decomposition of Estimated Changes in Real Credit
Regression equation:
Estimated shifts in the supply curve
1
Expansion period









Estimated shifts in the demand curve1
Expansion period






























































Sources: Tables 8-10; and data sources for estimation.
1The total changes are equal to the estimated change in the dependent variable, the natural logarithm of real credit to the
private sector. For both supply and demand, we exclude changes attributable to the lending and alternative interest rates in order
to focus on shifts in the curves.
During 1990-2000 the correlation coefficient between the capital account balance
and total financial credit to the private sector was 0.698.
On the demand side, a similar asymmetry arises between the two phases.
Improving macroeconomic conditions provided the key stimulus for credit growth
in all countries during the expansion, and in Mexico a tightening in access to
foreign financing—as reflected in a deteriorating EMBI price—reinforced this
effect. Only in the case of Colombia, however, did a subsequent deterioration in
macroeconomic conditions have a noticeable adverse impact on credit demand. In
Mexico and Peru, macroeconomic indicators in fact continued to improve,
although in the case of Mexico this effect was overwhelmed by an increase in
access to foreign financing, as shown by the large negative effect of EMBI on
credit demand.
Finally, comparing the size of the shifts in the supply and demand curves may
permit us to assess the degree of tightness in the credit markets in these three coun-
tries. According to our econometric results, in Colombia supply of credit by
commercial banks (DMB) greatly outpaced demand during the expansion,
primarily due to a relative abundance of loanable funds undoubtedly brought on in
part by deregulation undertaken early in the decade, which reduced certain advan-
tages that other intermediaries had acquired over banks in previous years.
181Adolfo Barajas and Roberto Steiner
When taking the financial sector as a whole, however, the opposite appears to
hold, with economic growth pushing demand faster than the rate at which supply
was growing. During the slowdown, the shifts in supply and demand curves were
roughly equivalent for the financial sector as a whole, thus requiring relatively
small adjustments in interest rates. In Mexico, the credit market appears to have
been tight at the end of the expansion, with demand having grown more rapidly
than supply, but this situation was reversed during the slowdown; although credit
supply did contract owing to a deceleration in lending capacity and increasing
credit risk and regulatory strictness, the major impact was on the demand side.
Peru exhibited pronounced accelerations of roughly the same size in demand and
supply during the expansion, but appears to have entered a period of increased
credit tightening; while demand has continued to grow, supply in recent years has
remained stagnant as a result of decreased willingness to lend.
IV. Conclusions
In our overview of credit growth in eight Latin American countries, six are
currently experiencing substantial slowdowns, which in many instances have
followed episodes of "credit booms." While the early slowdowns of Venezuela and
Chile seem to qualify as severe credit contractions, the current experience is still
moderate by international standards. The earlier experience in the region, however,
as well as that of other regions, suggests that credit slumps can be quite protracted.
It is certainly possible that the current slowdown might be signaling the beginning
of a long period of sluggish private sector credit. The latest figures confirm that
credit continues to decline in most of the countries analyzed.
Our analysis of balance sheets over the past twenty years shows that the evolu-
tion of deposits is by far the dominant factor both in the credit expansion and slow-
down stages. Interestingly, this dominant effect tends to be much stronger during
the expansion period. In fact, almost the entire expansion of credit can be ascribed
to an increase in loanable funds, in many instances associated with capital inflows.
While the decline in loanable funds is also important in explaining credit slow-
downs, other factors come into play; thus, the structure of balance sheets changed
considerably in the countries examined, particularly during the most recent period.
Econometric estimations for Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, covering both the
expansion and slowdown phases of the past decade, are also reported. We obtain
some results that are common to studies of other countries: macroeconomic condi-
tions significantly affect credit demand and sometimes credit supply; lending
capacity plays a key role in determining credit supply; and certain alternative interest
rates have a significant effect on credit demand. However, we also introduced two
additional sets of variables not included in previous studies, variables which we
suspected would be important determinants of credit supply or demand. On the one
hand, we incorporated credit risk and regulatory variables in the supply function, and
found that at least one was significant in each of the countries. Second, we incorpo-
rated the EMBI price for Mexico and Peru, finding that in the former case it reflected
substitution by borrowers from domestic to foreign sources, while in the latter case
it provided an additional signal on the macroeconomic environment.
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Our estimation approach allowed us to decompose the shifts in supply and
demand curves during the expansion and slowdown periods. Confirming the find-
ings of our examination of bank balance sheets, we saw on the supply side that the
expansions were driven primarily by lending capacity, while the risk and regula-
tory variables became key during the slowdown. On the demand side, the expan-
sion was characterized by improvements in macroeconomic conditions across all
countries, while in the slowdown only Colombia exhibited a clear impact of dete-
riorating conditions on credit demand. In Mexico, access to foreign funds
appeared to be the dominant factor, and in Peru demand has appeared to continue
its upward path in recent years. Finally, our results also served to highlight key
differences in the nature of the credit slowdown in the three countries. In
Colombia, with the most modest contraction of the three, supply and demand
shifts are roughly similar. In Mexico, the situation appears to be one of excess
supply, while the results for Peru point to possible excess demand for credit in
recent years.
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